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is chosen, it would force the legislatures either to repeal the laws or
to revise them so that their meaning is made clear to the executive
branch of government.
CIIAmLEs E. RED, III
POLICE REFUSAL OF A BLOOD TEST AS
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
In recent years, much has been written about the value of blood
tests in determining whether drivers of automobiles are under the
influence of alcohol. Most of this writing deals with the problem of
whether administering such a test against one's will violates constitu-
tional rights. Furthermore, there has been much discussion about the
evidentiary value of such tests. However, very little has been said
about the right of an accused to take a blood test. Closely connected
with this problem is the growing idea that a suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused is a denial of due process and a violation of
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. The recent California
case of In Re Martin' sets forth both problems: (i) suppression of evi-
dence as a violation of the due process clause, and (2) the right to take
a blood test when accused of drunk driving.
After having been arrested, Martin demanded a blood test to de-
termine the alcoholic content of his blood. This request, which was
first made to the arresting officer immediately after his arrest, was de-
nied. Martin made a second request, to the booking officer, offering
to bear the expense of the blood test. This was also denied. After
posting bond, Martin was released. He then made three more attempts
to have a blood test administered. He first telephoned his personal
physician, who said he would be unable to arrange for the test since
the laboratories were closed. Martin's last two attempts proved futile,
because the local hospitals refused to administer the test without
having police authorization, which officials refused to grant.
The defendant, upon being convicted of driving while under the
influence of alcohol and sentenced to fifteen days in jail, sought re-
lease by writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of California.
The Supreme Court ordered release of Martin, saying that the re-
fusal to give authorization was "analogous to a suppression of evi-
dence and a violation of due process of law. ' 2 While the police were
158 Cal. 2d 509, 24 Cal. Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 8oi (1962).
2374 P.2d at 8o.
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under no duty to assist the petitioner in his efforts to gain evidence,
they were under a duty not to interfere in any manner with his ef-
forts to obtain evidence necessary to his defense. 3
The idea that a suppression of evidence is a denial of due process
is a relatively new facet of legal thinking.4 Most of the cases dealing
with this problem usually contain two basic elements: one, the evi-
dence is already in existence, and two, the evidence is intentionally
suppressed by the prosecution.5 If the evidence is favorable to the
accused, and material, there seems to be little doubt that any inten-
tional suppression by the prosecution will result in a denial of due
process. This will have the effect of either entitling the defendant
to a new trial or release from custody, depending on the materiality
and the type of evidence involved. 6 But more recently, cases have gone
further by holding that the fact that evidence has been suppressed
is alone enough to constitute a violation of due process.7 Whether or
not the evidence has been intentionally suppressed and whether or
not it is favorable to the accused are no longer essential ingredients
in the violation of due process.8 The basic requirement of the four-
teenth amendment is that of a fair trial, and when there has been a
suppression of evidence, this is not fulfilled.9
The Martin case presents a further extension in that the denial of
an opportunity to obtain evidence is held to constitute a suppression
of evidence. Here the evidence, the chemical analysis of the alcoholic
content of the defendant's blood, is not yet in existence. However, an
earlier California case had said "that when, in the exercise of their
power to arrest, the police deprive the arrested person of the oppor-
tunity to obtain evidence that might establish his innocence, they are
suppressing it just as effectively as if it did exist and they withheld
3Ibid.
'The first case of importance which deals with the subject of suppression of
evidence was Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 1o3 (1935).
5Wi1de v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (i96o); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959);
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)-
0Ibid.
7Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.-d 8o (5th Cir. 1963) (appeal docketed); People v.
Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 2d 7,48, 3 Cal. Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673 (1960); People v. Savvides, 1
N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956).
8Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 512-15 (2d Cir. 1961); People v. Savvides, 1
N.Y.20d 554, 136 N-E-2d 853 (1956).
'Napue v. Illinois, 36o U.S. 264 (1959); McGarty v. O'Brien, 96 F. Supp. 704
(D. Mass. ig5i), aff'd, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951).
'0Application of Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 1 Cal. Rptr. 8o, 82 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
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If the Martin case is to be taken as an extension of the suppression
of evidence idea, then one must face the question of what are the limi-
tations to this denial of due process theory. It can hardly be said that
if a man is arrested for a felony and requests to be released so he can
go in search of evidence, a refusal will result in a suppression of evi-
dence and thus a denial of due process. The only way Martin could
be sure of a favorable verdict of not guilty is by having a scientific
test taken which establishes his innocence. Thus, the authorities closed
off this avenue of defense, by refusing authorization, and as a result,
Martin could not obtain a fair trial. In this case, the suppression of
evidence did go far enough so as to become a violation of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 But due process of the
law does not mean infallible process of law,12 and to extend the idea
of suppression of evidence to its limits would not only have drastic
results but would also be ridiculous.
As to the second problem presented by the Martin case, what is
meant by a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain a blood test?' 3 The
earlier California case of McCormick v. Municipal Court4 discussed
this question. The court said:
The mandatory duty imposed by section 851.1 of the Penal
Code, of requiring that an arrested person shall be permitted
at booking to make at least one telephone call can not ipso facto
be equated with "reasonable" opportunity to procure a phy-
sician.15
As the court indicated, what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to
secure a blood test must be determined in relation to the particular
circumstances. The controlling factor, it would seem, should be the
sincerity of the accused in his efforts to obtain the test as evidence on
his behalf. If he is sincere, he should be given a wide opportunity, in-
cluding the privilege of having a qualified person of his choice make
the test.16 The same standards, logically, would seem to apply in pro-
viding a reasonable opportunity to obtain any of the other chemical
tests used for the purpose of determining intoxication. All are admis-
sible as evidence. 17 The blood test, in comparison with saliva, urine,
31374 P.2d at 8o3.
"McGarty v. O'Brien, supra note 9, at 707-08.
"Annot., 78 A.L.R. 2d 9o5 (ig6i).
195 Cal. App. 2d 8ig, 16 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Dist. Ct. App. ig6i).
1116 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
1OPeople v. Dawson, 184 Cal. App. 2d 881, 7 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Super Ct. 196o).
Compare with Application of Howard, 2o8 Cal. App. 2d 709, 25 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
1737 N.D.L. Rev. 212, 217 (1961).
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cerebro-spinal fluid, and breath tests, is the most accurate, and so
most cases deal with blood tests.' s
In at least four states, the problem of a "reasonable opportunity"
is dealt with by statute.19 In Maryland 20 and Rhode Island,2 1 the
statutes place on the arresting officer a duty to inform the accused of
his right to a physical examination. A Michigan statute requires that
the arrested person "shall be advised" of his right to a blood test.22
And Virginia imposes a duty upon the person to whom the request is
made to take the accused to a qualified person for the purpose of ob-
taining a blood test.
23
The test should be given in dose proximity in time with the arrest
in order to be of evidentiary value.2 4 In Virginia, the test must be given
within two hours of the arrest in order to be used as evidence. 25 This
was not a problem in the Martin case as the evidence shows the ac-
cused made his request immediately after his arrest. In Application
of Howard,26 the refusal of the authorities to grant a request for a
L'Id. at 218-19.
'aMd. Ann. Code art. 35, § oo (Supp. 1963); Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625a (Supp.
1961); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 31-27-3 (1956); Va. Code Ann. § 18.1- 5 5 (b) (Supp.
1962).
mMd. Ann. Code art. 35, § 100 (Supp. 1963).
21R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 31-27-3 (1956): "Right of person charged with oper-
ating under influence to physical examination-A person arrested and charged
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotic drugs or
intoxicating liquor, whatever its alcoholic content, shall have the right to be ex-
amined at his own expense immediately after his arrest, by a physician selected by
him, and the officer so arresting or so charging such person shall immediately inform
such person of this right and afford him a reasonable opportunity to exercise
the same, and at the trial of such person the prosecution must prove that he was so
informed and afforded such opportunity." (This Rhode Island statute is probably
the strongest and most liberal of all state statutes in providing for a reasonable
opportunity).
2-rhe Michigan statute also provides that "any person charged with driving a
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall have the right to
demand that the test provided for in this section must be given him..." Mich.
Comp. Laws § 257.625a(3) (Supp. 1961).
21"[B]ut if the person arrested does not refuse to permit the taking of blood,
or having refused, thereafter and within two hours of the time of arrest requests
that a blood sample be taken the person arrested shall be entitled to the benefit
of such test. It then shall be the duty of the arresting officer, or whoever has cus-
tody of the person arrested at the time such request is made, forthwith to carry
the person arrested to a person qualified under this section to withdraw the blood
sample." Va. Code Ann. § i8.a-5 5 (b) (Supp. 1962). Virginia is an implied consent
state but its statute is different from most such statutes in making provisions for a
test on the demand of the accused.
437.l P.2d at 803.
"Wa. Code Ann. § 18.1-55(b) (Supp. 1962).
2o8 Cal. App. 2d 709, 25 Cal. Rptr. 59o (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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blood test was upheld as not being a violation of due process. The ac-
cused had made a request that the test be given by her personal phy-
sician, who lived a great distance away, and the court felt that when
the time element was considered there had been no showing that her
rights had been denied.
Another important limitation imposed on the right of an accused
to take a blood test is that the request must be made at the proper
place, which is the scene of the booking for arrest.2 7 This means that a
request to take a blood test made to the arresting officer may be de-
nied without being a violation of due process. 28 The court in In Re
Martin said, "It would be unreasonable to impose on an arresting offi-
cer an obligation to accede to various requests made by the prisoner in-
cluding a request for a blood test.
' 2 9
In a few states the reasonable opportunity problem may have
been settled by statutes which provide that drivers who use the high-
ways impliedly consent to take the blood test.30 In a state that has
this type of statute, the driver must take a blood test when accused of
drunk driving, or lose his license.31 The accused, under some of these
state statutes, is also given the right to obtain an additional test of
his own.32 It seems that with the ever increasing number of automo-
bile accidents, implied consent statutes will be adopted by more states,
and thus the problem of the accused's right to a blood test eventually
may be eliminated.
EDWARD J. DINKEL, III
"In re Koelme, 54 Cal. 2d 757, 8 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437, 356 P.2d 179, 181 (1960).
8Ibid.
224 Cal. Rptr. at 834, 374 P.2d at 8o2.
'*Idaho Code Ann. § 49-352 (Supp. 1955); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-1oo1 (Supp.
1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39.727.03 (196o); N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194
(1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 (1960); S.D. Code § 44.oo2-2 (Supp. 196o); Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (Supp. 1957); Va. Stat. Ann. § 18.1-55 (Supp. 1962). See also




mKan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-1oo4 (Supp. 1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39.727.03 (1960);
N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic § 1194 (196o); Vt. Stat. Ann. fit. 23 § 1188 (1959).
